Gi Heung (Gi) Kim

I am a 6th year PhD Candidate in Applied Economics at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I am on the 2024-2025 academic job market.

I study topics at the intersection of industrial organization and real estate finance. My job market paper examines how changes in the U.S. real estate brokers' incentives impact their competition and the broader housing market.

I am advised by Maisy Wong (Chair), Sophie Calder-Wang, Juan Camilo Castillo, Matthew Grennan, and Benjamin Keys.

Here is a link to my curriculum vitae (CV)

Research Areas: Industrial Organization, Real Estate Finance


“Gi” is pronounced as “ghee”.

Research

Working Papers

The Equilibrium Impacts of Broker Incentives on the Real Estate Market
(Job Market Paper)

Abstract and draft coming soon 

Abstract:This paper empirically evaluates the impact of algorithmic pricing on the U.S. multifamily rental market. We hand-collect data on management company adoption decisions of algorithmic pricing and combine it with a comprehensive database of building-level rents and occupancy from 2005 to 2019. We find strong evidence that algorithmic pricing helps building managers set prices that are more responsive to market conditions, with adopters lowering rents more rapidly than non-adopters during economic downturns. We also find that average rents are higher and average occupancies are lower in markets with greater algorithmic penetration during periods of economic recovery. Then, we estimate a structural model of housing demand to test for "algorithmic coordination." Compared to a model of own profit maximization, our pair-wise tests favor a model of joint profit maximization among adopters of the same software. We estimate that the coordination channel results in an average markup increase of $25 per unit per month, impacting about 4.2 million units nationwide. Our findings have important implications for regulators and policymakers concerned about the potential risks and trade-offs of algorithmic pricing.

Work In Progress

Diagnosing Price Dispersion: Demand, Bargaining, and Search in Hospital-Supplier Contracting
With Matthew Grennan and Ashley Swanson

Abstract: Using detailed purchase order data for a sample of US hospitals 2009-15, we document large price dispersion across hospital buyers for identical brands in a variety of important medical supply categories. Hospitals also vary dramatically in the size and composition of the set of suppliers they contract with, and on average contract with less than a third of the suppliers available in the market. We develop a model and identification strategy to determine the extent to which this dispersion is determined by brand preferences, search/contracting costs, and bargaining abilities. Estimates suggest that markups are primarily driven by a lack of price sensitivity among health care providers in their usage decisions. Hospital administrator bargaining ability varies widely across hospitals, driving most of the observed price dispersion. Reducing search/contracting costs impacts hospital surplus through putting higher value brands in the choice set.

Teaching

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